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This article discusses the emergence of global therapeutic governance or the 
influence of social psychology on international development policy. Therapeutic 
governance links psychosocial well-being and security, and seeks to foster 
personalities able to cope with risk and insecurity. The article analyses how Western 
alarm at the destabilising impact of development eroded its support for an 
industrialisation model of development. The article then examines how the basic 
needs model is underpinned by social psychological theories and involves an 
abandonment of national development. Finally the article considers development as 
therapeutic governance and the implications of abandoning national development for 
the concept of human security. 
 
Introduction 
 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) recently declared mental illness to be one of 
the major health concerns for the twenty-first century, but it is not only health 
organisations which are interested in the subject. Mental well-being of populations is 
attracting wider attention among international policy-makers from the World Bank to 
the Department of International Development (DFID). This article considers the 
emergence of global therapeutic governance or the influence of social psychology on 
international development policy. What do I mean by therapeutic governance? 
Therapeutic governance refers to management of populations‟ psychology, and its 
significance for security. Therapeutic governance makes a link between psychosocial 
well-being and security, and seeks to foster personalities able to cope with risk and 
insecurity. So an individual‟s sense of psychosocial well-being is not simply of 
personal concern, but is an aspect of good governance. 
 
The emergence of therapeutic governance is linked to development‟s demise and 
absorption into security as human security.
1
 Human security has been promoted by 
proponents as broadening our approach to security and as a belated corrective to state-
centric security Against conflation of security with the state, the concept is used to 
distinguish state security and individual security. The concept recognises how security 
should not be reduced to the security of the state and that security is ultimately about 
protecting individuals. The concept is further invoked to challenge assumptions over 
the state providing security and to highlight how the state is too often a violator of 
individuals‟ security. The concept of human security has taken off among 
international organisations and among Western donor states. Notably Canada and 
Japan as donor countries have been prominently involved in elaborating the concept, 
Canada primarily in relation to humanitarian intervention (Axworthy, 1999) and 
Japan primarily in relation to its development aspects (Obuchi, 1999). The United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) within the UN system has been most 
closely associated with promoting the concept in its work, notably in its 1994 annual 
human development report on New Dimensions of Human Security. Despite its 
evident appeal, the concept of human security has been criticised as a rather vague 
concept, at once encompassing everything but thereby becoming meaningless (King 
and Murray, 2001-2002; Mack, 2004). Its appeal is seen as rhetorical and of limited 
practicability. I concur with various criticisms made of the concept of human security. 
Nevertheless, the concept is politically significant, its attraction related to the demise 
of national development and the developing state. Here I am primarily concerned with 
the development aspects of human security, but its military humanitarian agenda, 
questioning the capacity of the developing state to protect its population, arises 
logically from the changed international development agenda. 
 
From the development perspective, the concept of human security essentially 
represents an attempt to salvage a demoralised development agenda by harnessing 
itself directly to the security field. Although proponents of the concept see human 
security as broadening international security, such an understanding overlooks how 
international development‟s establishment as a subject and policy area represented a 
broad international security approach. The rise of international development was 
bound up with international security policies, conditioned by the balance of power 
and the security concerns of the major powers, notably the United States. Western 
states‟ support for international development has historically been qualified by fears 
of its destabilising impact on societies and only supported in so far as it is regarded as 
furthering international order. Indeed the very concept of development has been 
analysed as meaning „ordered progress‟ and its history bound up with the security 
context (Cowen and Shenton, 1995; Duffield, 2001). Importantly, however, the Cold 
War security paradigm allowed international development to evolve as a field 
relatively independent of security. Development‟s independent path represented a 
broader, more optimistic international agenda; development‟s re-incorporation into 
security signals a narrower, pessimistic agenda. Anticipating my argument, if 
development has previously involved strategies reconciling order and progress, 
today‟s development model involves reconciling people to a world without 
expectations of material progress. The contemporary outlook essentially seeks to 
improve people‟s sense of well-being in the absence of material transformation by 
reforming the subjectivity of populations, that is a form of therapeutic governance. In 
other words, the broadening of security denotes expansion of security measures and 
contraction of the developmental agenda. 
 
The article highlights how ideas from social psychology have influenced how 
development thinking has responded to security concerns. I begin by analysing how 
the Cold War promoted consensus over international development and Western 
support for modernisation. I next examine how Western alarm at the destabilising 
impact of development eroded support for an industrialisation model of development 
and informed the basic needs model. I then examine how the basic needs model is 
underpinned by social psychological theories and involves an abandonment of 
national development. Finally I consider development as therapeutic governance and 
the implications of abandoning national development for the concept of human 
security.   
 
International development and Cold War security 
 
International development policy was born in the context of national independence 
struggles and Cold War competition between the Western and Soviet blocs for 
influence in the newly independent states. A core concern of Western policy-makers 
was the destabilising impact of weak pre-industrial states on an international order 
based on the principle of states guaranteeing their own security. Another key concern 
was securing the new states to the Western bloc. How could the newly independent 
states be developed so that they were stable states without becoming new security 
threats to the West, whether in their own right or by coming under Soviet influence? 
Western thinking was underpinned by racial fears of the international balance of 
slipping from Western nations with the ascendancy of formerly subject peoples in 
Asia and Africa, including demographically, although such racialised thinking had 
become unacceptable to express internationally (Furedi, 1997, 1998). These fears 
built on fears of the masses and their new political role in the mass societies created 
through industrialisation, urbanisation and the erosion of tradition, which the new 
science of social psychology sought to address (Dollard et al, 1938; Gasset, 1961; 
LeBon, 1995). Conversely Western thinking was conscious of „The Choice‟ that 
developing countries enjoyed internationally (Galbraith, 1964, p. 23). Policy-advisors 
repeatedly warned of competing with the Soviets for the hearts and minds of the 
South and the need to outline „what we have to offer the developing country as 
compared with the Communists‟ (ibid., p. 24). Indicative of the security 
preoccupations underlying economic development policy, Walt Rostow‟s famous 
treatise on The Stages of Economic Growth is subtitled A Non-Communist Manifesto. 
Consequently Western qualms over development‟s potential to destabilise the existing 
international order were suppressed by concerns that if the West did not promote a 
development programme for industrialisation then the new states would turn 
communist. The Western model of modernisation was to promote Westernisation and 
secure the developing countries to the Western bloc. Indicatively US capital 
investment was concentrated on regions such as Asia-Pacific which were considered 
important strategically. 
 
Thus Cold War rivalry, although involving ideologically divergent visions, fostered 
international consensus over the necessity of development. Ironically the Cold War 
climate allowed international development thinking to evolve a path distinct from 
security policy to a greater degree than the post-Cold War era. Western policy-
makers, having accepted the necessity of promoting economic development, hoped 
that reducing the economic development gap between states would also reduce 
ideological differences and promote international consensus around the values of the 
advanced Western industrial states (Etzioni, 1962, p. 203). Development thinking 
complimented Western postwar domestic policy, which drew political legitimacy 
from economic prosperity and the model of the citizen as a consumer. Citizens‟ 
loyalty was to be engineered through appealing to their unconscious, irrational desires 
and promoting their identification with the mass consumer products of capitalism 
(Bernays, 1956).  
 
International economic development goals were initially ambitious and meant the 
industrialisation of the newly independent states, designated developing countries. 
Development thinking revolved around the difficulties of generating economic take-
off and urban industrial development; questioning whether it should be pursued was 
not acceptable internationally. Industrialisation was also considered essential for 
realising social justice, not opposed to it. This view was not confined to the Bretton 
Wood institutions, but was also held by international welfare organisations such as 
UNICEF as the leading international child agency which regarded policies prioritising 
national economic growth as compatible with child welfare concerns (UNICEF, 
1964).  
 
Becoming Modern? 
 
In practice however developing countries found it difficult to secure large capital 
investment from the West unless like Japan or Taiwan they were viewed as important 
strategically in the Cold War. While the invisible hand of the market failed to 
generate capital, Western aid policy seemed to favour technical assistance (Galbraith, 
1964, p. 58). To compensate for the lack of external capital, local investment was to 
be maximised by limiting population growth and improving peoples‟ skills and 
productivity. In this endeavour, Western modernisation strategists asked whether 
cultural change was a prerequisite of modernisation (Ikeles, and Smith, 1974, p. 9). It 
was suggested people‟s aspirations needed to be raised to foster the demand for 
economic growth. Rostow argued that „the horizon of expectations must lift; and men 
must become prepared for a life of change and specialized function‟ (Rostow, 1971, p. 
26). Works such as David McClelland‟s The Achieving Society sought to identify the 
„mental virus‟ that drives people to achieve and therefore promote economic growth, 
and to train people to „infect‟ others with the need to achieve. Again the economist 
J.K. Galbraith wanted to tackle „the equilibrium of poverty‟, that is, the poor‟s 
accommodation to poverty, their „absence of aspiration‟ and „the tendency to prefer 
acquiescence to frustration‟ (Galbraith, 1979, pp. 61-62). Literacy, Galbraith 
proposed, could be used as a tool for raising aspirations (Galbraith, 1964, pp. 42-46). 
 
Accordingly international development policy from its inception has been interested 
in the psychology of populations. Yet the cultural and personal traits viewed as 
desirable in Western thinking have changed considerably. Sixty years ago the 
desirable character to be cultivated was the rational ambitious mature masculine ego, 
inoculating the individual against the perceived irrationalism of mass society as well 
as challenging the atavistic remnants of traditional society. This conception of the 
ideal citizen as an ambitious masculine moderniser contrasts sharply with today‟s 
sustainable development ideal of the emotionally sensitive, modest female personality 
living in equilibrium with nature.  
 
But even as the ideal of the modern personality was being championed, anxieties over 
the destabilising impact of development remained in Western thinking, notably in the 
culture and personality school of anthropology centred at the University of Columbia 
spearheaded by the work of Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead. Their research 
consciously eschewed the earlier racial thinking, which propounded the pathological 
condition of the deracinated native. Indeed their anthropological research into non-
Western societies was partly driven by their doubts over the character of Western 
civilisation and prevailing Western notions of progress (Benedict, 1961, for example). 
These concerns over their own societies in turn informed their concerns over the risks 
to the personality of populations undergoing rapid political, social and economic 
change. Research concerned with the functionality of the non-Western culture and 
personality in circumstances of rapid change remained an important strand of Western 
thinking as an adjunct to Western security policy, particularly in relation to the 
strategically important areas of Asia. Publications on the Third World mind, notably 
in Asian countries, and the difficulty of nation building and promoting a democratic 
political culture were a staple theme in Western area studies and political science 
literature influenced by social psychology. 
 
Psychosocial risk studies sought to evaluate the risk factors for Third World 
revolution and could provoke international controversy, most vividly testified in the 
scandal over the aborted Camelot project (Herman, 1995, pp. 124-173). Psychosocial 
perspectives were marginalised within international development policy, which 
embraced rapid economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s. The psychosocial 
perspectives were also marginal in peace studies which was dominated by structural 
approaches too rather than approaches from social psychology which informed 
conflict studies. Indeed Johan Galtung, a leading figure in peace studies, helped 
expose the Camelot project (ibid.), illustrating how the general international climate 
in peace and development studies was hostile to psychosocial risk analysis of 
developing countries. So although other US risk analysis projects did quietly go ahead 
these projects were not well received internationally. These concerns were surfaced in 
subsequent decades.  
 
Problems of the Affluent Society  
 
Early international development thinking saw rural poverty as the great evil to be 
eradicated. Urban poverty however visible was regarded in the optimistic progressive 
outlook as a lesser evil to rural poverty and a condition whose extremes were a 
transitory feature of a dynamic industrialising economy – moreover one that also 
provided its own checks. For mobile urban populations had greater expectations of 
well-being and opportunities for political engagement, and therefore to articulate and 
defend their interests. But the very advantages that the urban poor enjoyed over their 
rural cousins also raised the spectre of political radicalisation and social instability. 
Policy-makers had followed modernisation‟s impact on societies from the inception of 
international development policy. Large international conferences were held in the 
1950s, prominently the United Nations/UNESCO 1956 seminar on urbanisation in 
Asia and Middle East and the United Nations/UNESCO 1959 on urbanisation in Latin 
America. Urbanisation studies repeatedly warned that although urbanisation was 
happening (cities were growing), urbanism (the adoption of urban norms) was not 
(Nelson, 1969; Ginsburg, 1966). Achieving a sense of identity was more difficult and 
perplexing in an urban world, it was argued (Wood, 1966, p. 51). The social 
atomization of urban life fostered alienation and anxiety in individuals leading them 
to seek release in violence (Kornhauser, 1960, p. 32). Modernisation and the erosion 
of traditional ties exposed the worker to „new forms of gratification‟ resulting in 
„confusions and disorientations‟ (Smelser, 1966, p. 123). Moreover the developing 
nations faced more complex problems in realising a stable identity because the legacy 
of colonial rule (Curle, 1971, p. 40). Rather than modernising too slowly it was 
suggested, „the developing nation may destroy too rapidly various traditional forms of 
integration and unleash explosive levels of unrest‟ in its bid for modernisation 
(Smelser, 1966, p. 130). In summary, it was feared that, „Modernization along broadly 
capitalist lines tends to produce a highly restless, insecure population‟ (Berger et al, 
1974, p. 123). But even before alarm over Third World development became 
manifest, Western concerns over the direction of their own societies cast doubt on 
international modernisation strategies. 
 The problems of the „affluent society‟ whose technological advancement had made 
the work of millions redundant loomed large (Galbraith, 1962). Economists argued 
for policies maintaining employment when production, it was argued, was becoming 
important for employment rather than for the goods themselves and warned against 
not addressing the risks of nervous breakdown (Keynes, 1931). The psychological not 
just the financial consequences of being deprived of employment were extensively 
discussed. Intellectuals such as Hannah Arendt were concerned that the emancipation 
of labour was not ushering in an age of freedom or nourishing higher activities but 
more consumption: „the more time left to him, the greedier and more craving his 
appetites‟ (Arendt, 1998, p. 133). „Man […] must be adapted to leisure, and his work 
must become occupational therapy‟ it was argued (Gabor, 1964, pp. 108-109, 
emphasis added). These debates may have had little impact on Western domestic 
production, but did influence how policy-makers thought about strategies for 
international development. Employment was put forward as the goal of international 
development (Galbraith, 1964, p. 9; ILO, 1969, 1976), deprioritising technological 
investment and encouraging policies for labour retention.  
 
Events within Western societies in the 1960s reinforced alarm over modernisation‟s 
course. Civil disturbances, political assassinations, urban riots and youth disaffection 
challenged the efficacy of engineering consent through consumerism. The major US 
national inquiries into civil unrest had ramifications for international development 
thinking. Domestic debates reinforced fears that urbanisation fostered ghettos of mass 
poverty, alienation and political instability. Urban poverty may have been regarded by 
the urban poor as a step up from rural poverty (Galbraith, 1979, p. 51), but policy-
makers were nervous about its social effects, renewing their interest developing the 
rural economy and stemming the flow of migration (Kerner Commission, 1968, p. 
236). Employment generation policies gave more attention to self-development and 
how to support people developing „their own capabilities‟, including counselling in 
relation to the „willingness to work‟ (ibid., p. 223, p. 315). In short, the psychology of 
the unemployed gained new interest. 
 
Attention towards the psychology of the poor was reinforced by another theme, 
namely that the sources of insecurity and violence could be found within the self. As 
the National Commission on Violence argued, „we must look inward as well as 
outward to the causes and prevention of violence‟ (National Commission on Violence, 
1969, pp. 210-11). Civil violence was linked by US government advisers to the 
„revolution of rising expectations‟ backfiring and creating frustration (Kerner 
Commission, 1968, p. 106). Both the Kerner Commission and the National 
Commission on Violence highlighted how too high expectations of what society could 
do had intensified dissatisfactions and fuelled the riots (ibid., p. 106). The National 
Commission on Violence argued that, „a rapid increase in human expectations 
followed by obvious failure to meet those expectations has been and continues to be a 
prescription for violence‟ (National Commission on Violence, 1969, p. 41). Galbraith 
had already warned against the prevailing „divine‟ doctrine, as he characterised it, that 
increased consumer production was „the great solvent of tensions associated with 
inequality‟ (Galbraith, 1962, p. 86). If the production of many goods was 
unnecessary, save as a means of employment, consumerism was an insecure basis for 
building civic loyalty, Galbraith argued. An economy increasingly geared towards 
non-essential consumer production and dependent on consumer indebtedness, he 
warned, would foster economic instability and employment insecurity. Moreover 
Galbraith contended that increased producing was merely creating „a higher level of 
want creation necessitating a higher level of want satisfaction‟ (ibid., p. 136). The 
inference drawn was that more attention should be paid to the subjective aspects of 
poverty, not just its objective aspects. Tellingly the Kerner Commission emphasises 
relative poverty rather absolute poverty as causing the grievances behind the violence. 
The idea that the new social violence arising in Western societies was a „product of 
prosperity‟ (Crosland, 1961), and not simply poverty, was discussed across the 
Atlantic too.  
 
Industrialisation of developing countries, supported where compatible with Western 
security interests, was cast into doubt when the process seemed to threaten those 
security interests. As one study observed, „there is a widespread and […] increasing 
linkage between modernization and the rise of social dissatisfaction and revolutionary 
consciousness‟ (Berger et al, 1974, p. 122). Civil unrest domestically and 
internationally, the Vietnam War, population growth in the South and the 
international oil crisis in which non-Western states were seen capable of holding 
Western states to ransom, together contributed to an incremental retreat from 
modernisation strategies in Western development thinking from the late 1960s 
onwards. 
 
Frustrating development 
 
The new Western development thinking took up the idea that expectations and wants 
needed to be moderated in the developing world too for the sake of international 
peace and security. Development thinking evolved a needs-based approach informed 
by the psychologist Abraham Maslow‟s theory of frustration. E.F. Schumacher‟s 
seminal work Small is Beautiful rejected modernisation strategies and called for 
moderating wants, arguing that raising material aspirations was no recipe for 
international security:   
 
the foundations of peace cannot be laid by universal prosperity, in the 
modern sense, because such prosperity, if attainable at all, is attainable 
only by cultivating such drives of human nature as greed and envy 
(Schumacher, 1973, p. 28). 
 
To the spectre of disorder was added the spectre of ecological crisis as Malthusian 
fears re-surged, especially following the oil crisis and Western panic over access to 
raw materials in the Third World. Furthermore, modernisation was attacked as 
corrupting humanity and leading to the moral impoverishment of people‟s lives. 
Schumacher‟s work condemns human hubris in seeking to transcend nature and 
expresses a desire to return to a simpler, more spiritual way of life, more tied to 
nature. These ideas echo Romantic thought and its attacks on the soulless character of 
modernity and compliments anthropological research inspired in part to recover 
alternative ways of life by studying indigenous populations least tainted by modern 
life. In this critique, the undeveloped world becomes a moral exemplar for the 
developed world. 
 
Mainstream arguments were paralleled in Western radical thought, increasingly 
averse to the Soviet model, particularly after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 
and trying to grapple with failure to mobilise a mass radical movement. Herbert 
Marcuse‟s One Dimensional Man, which acquired a cult following among radical 
circles of the late 1960s, attacked western consumer culture as creating false needs 
and anaesthetising individuals‟ consciousness against society‟s wrongs. Marcuse 
importantly argued that only those outside the industrial productive processes had the 
psychic integrity to rebel. „Liberation from the Affluent Society‟, another of his works 
proclaimed (Marcuse, 1968). Marcuse, like Galbraith, did not dismiss the material 
needs of people in developing countries, nevertheless, these anti-modernisation ideas 
became applied to thinking about the problems of developing countries. Adam Curle, 
who founded peace studies at Bradford University, for example, deplored how „many 
men‟s ambitions have been ensnared by the West and they have adopted many of its 
techniques and values‟ (Curle, 1971, p. 39). Curle further contended that, „the actual 
efforts made to achieve development, which is supposed by some to reduce violence, 
can themselves be a source of violence‟ (ibid., p. 78). Hence there was a convergence 
of Western thinking questioning the wisdom of industrialisation and the existing 
modernisation strategies and seeking to relativise development, although still seeking 
to universalise its post-industrial civic norms. These perspectives were institutionally 
reinforced by the development of an international non-governmental aid sector 
fostered by Western donor preference for technical assistance to the developing 
world, and the switch of official aid from bilateral to NGO aid. 
 
By the mid-1970s it was evident that the thrust of official international thinking was 
turning against transforming the means of production and re-orientating around 
securing the basic needs of populations, primarily through policies maintaining 
labour-intensive production. The new sustainable development thinking condemned 
the nascent industrialised wage economies as causing terrible social disruption and 
misery, rather than reducing poverty. Capital-intensive industrial production was 
criticised for creating unemployment and as being more exploitative than the older 
pre-industrial forms because of eroding small-scale dispersed ownership and 
concentrating the ownership of the means of production (Sen, 1975, p. 38). Mindful 
of industrialisation‟s risks, the ILO proposed an investment shift „from physical to 
human capital, from urban to rural development, from capital-intensive to labour-
intensive activities, and from the production of non-essential consumer goods to 
essential ones‟ (ILO, 1976, p. 7). The ILO‟s World Employment Programme set out 
„the promotion of employment and the satisfaction of the basic needs of each 
country‟s population‟ as „a priority objective‟ (para 49 in ILO, 1977, p. 10). Policies 
such as tractorization were rejected for intermediate technology (Sen, 1975, pp. 154-
164). 
 
Retaining labour-intensive production became a core strategy of international 
development. As part of this strategy, there was a new interest in self-employment 
and family labour to generate employment (ibid.). Non-wage employment generation 
was attractive because it would build on family and communal networks, and 
therefore help maintain social stability, rather than disrupt them as industrialisation 
policies had. Equally non-wage employment generation was attractive because it was 
regarded as not subject to the same vagaries of an economy (and employment) based 
on non-essential consumer production, as Galbraith had warned against in his critique 
of the affluent society. Non-wage employment generation would also help keep wants 
moderate and contain non-essential consumer production (ibid., p. 94). 
 
Yet the sustainable development model in rejecting advancing the means of 
production recoils from substantial material and social transformation. Its thinking 
consciously seeks to highlight problems of social exploitation and empower the poor 
in codifying basic needs as rights. Nevertheless the sustainable development model 
actually breaks the linkage between material and social progress made by earlier 
thinking, whether capitalist or Marxist inspired theories. Its understanding has moved 
away from a social structural approach towards an approach directed towards 
changing people‟s subjectivity and relations at the micro level to improve society. 
Accordingly structural problems are not understood in terms of the mode of 
production but are also naturalised or understood in social psychological terms. 
Sustainable development thinking emphasises limits to growth and naturalises 
underdevelopment, although the spectacular growth of China and other Asian 
countries in recent years belies such assumptions. The model implies people‟s lives 
will continue to be dominated by necessity and at best implies a fairer distribution of 
poverty. Tellingly the World Bank‟s Voices of the Poor report, discussed below, 
emphasises how the poor express very moderate needs (Narayan et al, 2000a, 2000b). 
Leaving aside important methodological issues as to how its policy conclusions could 
be reached (Pender, 2002), its recommendations demonstrate a very different 
international development agenda from that of the pioneering development period 
which wanted to shake the „equilibrium of poverty‟ and encourage the poor to aspire 
to substantial material improvement. Since international development merely aspires 
to a labour-intensive, self-employment economy the majority of the world‟s 
population is destined for subsistence living. In other words, international 
development now resembles a self-help survival strategy for populations rather than 
truly a development policy. 
 
Reducing development to survival strategies has severe ramifications for developing 
states. The approach both legitimises populations in the developing world having a 
lower standard of living and also limits what a developing state can offer its 
population in terms of social goods, as earlier development thinking accepted 
(Galbraith, 1979, p. 11). For a non-wage-based economy orientated around survival 
neither builds a national economy, nor a developed state infrastructure that could 
distribute social goods. Unsurprisingly hostility towards the new development 
thinking and its retreat from industrialisation was expressed by developing countries, 
which voiced mistrust over the basic needs concept after some initial support 
Aspelagh, (1979, p. 404). Hostility at the implied perpetuation of international 
inequality between the developed and developing world is evident in responses to the 
ILO‟s World Employment Programme (ILO, 1977, p. 13). So although developing 
countries strongly criticised Western modernisation models and denounced 
inequitable terms of trade, their criticisms did not amount to a rejection of 
industrialisation per se. Take the famous UN General Assembly 1974 Declaration on 
the Establishment of a New Economic Order sponsored by Non-Aligned Movement 
states. This declaration like so many UN declarations had little practical effect in 
changing international relations. Nevertheless it did articulate developing countries‟ 
aspirations for industrialization and modern technology as part of „accelerating the 
development of developing countries‟. However, the governments of developing 
countries‟ views progressively carried less weight: their weak capacity undermining 
their political legitimacy and encouraging more repressive rule, in turn eroding their 
moral legitimacy to represent their populations both domestically and internationally. 
The end of the Cold War finally eroded the international space that the developing 
countries had carved out for themselves amid East-West rivalry.  
 
Therapeutic governance 
 
Fundamental contradictions exist in the radical post-development agenda, which seeks 
transformation of relations along the lines of post-industrial societies without 
substantial economic transformation. These fundamental contradictions are possible 
because of its rejection of raising material expectations and its psychologised 
understanding of justice and its conception of social transformation in terms of 
psychosocial change. An emphasis on psychological needs has long been apparent in 
peace and development education (Aspelagh, 1979; Burns and Aspelagh, 1996), but 
development policy too increasingly conceives needs in psychological rather than 
material terms. Development‟s therapeutic turn parallels trends in Western domestic 
social policy giving new attention to the subjectivity of the poor and unemployed in 
which the psychosocial concept of social inclusion has displaced that of social 
equality. In the social inclusion model, low self-esteem is seen not just as an aspect of 
poverty but becomes its substantial meaning, while social recognition of the poor as 
opposed to the eradication of poverty has become the meaning of justice. 
Development becomes a form of therapeutic governance focused on enhancing 
people‟s capacities, motivation and sense of well-being within their existing material 
circumstances.  
 
The World Bank‟s Voices of the Poor report has been heralded as a groundbreaking 
approach with its participatory methodology, analysis and methodology, signalling a 
new inclusive course for development policy that takes the personal experience of the 
poor as its starting point. The authors‟ put forward its methodology as a radical 
departure, but its approach essentially abandons social theory for an intuitive 
understanding of society. Analysis of the feelings, interpersonal relationships and 
daily interactions of the poor becomes translated into strategies seeking to manage the 
feelings, interpersonal relationships and daily interactions of the poor. In other words, 
the report exemplifies how development policy is now influenced by a psychological 
understanding and conceive social transformation and social justice in psychological 
terms. Effectively the onus is on households to access opportunities and secure their 
own welfare rather than the state. Thus the report suggests that interviewees‟ 
expectations that the state solve their problems is linked to a dependency culture and 
New Deal-type mass employment schemes are not considered as a policy option 
(Narayan, et al, 2000a, p. 62). Instead the report proposes that social change be 
achieved through a chain reaction of personal transformation: 
 
Change is brought about by individuals in interaction with other 
individuals, one step at a time. Hence individual commitment, values, and 
behaviour matter and can be the most potent sources of change as 
committed individuals interconnect (ibid., p. 227). 
 
Thus in so far as the state‟s role is considered in the lives of the poor, the report tends 
to focus on reforming institutional norms to stamp out corruption and ensure officials 
do not humiliate the poor and are more respectful to them.  
 
The report demonstrates how a therapeutic concept of well-being is displacing 
universal prosperity as the goal of international development policy. The World Bank 
proposes that „Well-being and illbeing are states of mind and being. Wellbeing has a 
psychological and spiritual dimension as a mental state of harmony, happiness and 
peace of mind.‟ arguing moreover that „Wealth and wellbeing are seen as different 
even contradictory‟ (Narayan et al, 2000b, p. 21). The report‟s emphasis on the 
psychological dimensions of poverty is declared to derive from the poor‟s own 
definitions of poverty. Yet a closer examination of the final report along side the 
individual country findings suggests that the authors‟ construction of the interviews 
and selection of extracts are used to endorse a pre-existing policy agenda abandoning 
substantial material transformation (Pender, 2002). Interviewees, for example, speak 
of how unemployment makes them depressed. This observation is then used by the 
authors to support the idea that depression is hindering people from finding 
employment (Narayan et al, 2000b). The World Bank‟s approach has been taken up in 
official policies. DFID, for example, has closely associated itself with the Voices of 
the Poor report. Former development minister Clare Short wrote the foreword to the 
report. DFID held workshops for its staff on the report. The department too is 
showing a new concern for mental health, and has recently commissioned research on 
mental health in developing countries, linking poverty to mental health problems. 
 
Fostering self-esteem is also now a core theme of international development 
strategies. Sen‟s influential writing, for example, has drawn attention to people‟s 
subjective experience of their circumstances, suggesting policies orientated towards 
improving people‟s self-esteem, how they feel about themselves and their work. Sen 
emphasises employment as providing self-esteem as well as income rather than 
production (Sen, 1975, p. 5). He is troubled by definitions of employment excluding 
many non-wage income generating activities people are involved in and therefore fail 
to give people recognition in their work. Consequently he argues for changing how 
certain work is viewed, „Unemployment is a state of being without fruitful work and 
the perception of fruitful work is, to a large extent, a result of social conditioning‟ 
(ibid., p. 40, emphasis added). The strategy involves therapeutically re-describing as 
employment casual activities such as street hawking that economists previously 
regarded as hidden unemployment. Indeed Sen admits how previous economic 
thinking considered such non-wage labour disparagingly as self-help survival 
strategies (ibid., p. 4, p. 45).  
 
In its flight from materialism, development thinking evades how poverty is to be 
eradicated and basic needs are to be realised in the absence of national economic 
development supporting the development of a modern state. The redistributive 
welfare state was preceded by industrial development which fostered an impersonal 
public sphere and the necessary infrastructure to make redistribution a possibility 
(Weber, 1954). Otherwise people will continue to rely on nepotism, that is, their 
informal networks to secure their needs and ambitions, militating against the 
eradication of corruption and the development of an efficient bureaucracy (Lipset, 
1959, p. 66), which the World Bank seeks. Indicatively perhaps, the Voices of the 
Poor report speaks of „the collective good‟ being achieved through „personal 
commitment‟ creating „small miracles‟ (Narayan et al, 2000a, p. 227).  
 
Unrealisable without a developed state, promoting basic needs as rights works at the 
psychological level, giving symbolic moral recognition of the poor to the poor and the 
rest of society. This symbolic recognition, or statement of moral commitment, it is 
hoped, will foster their self-esteem, thereby empowering them with the confidence to 
act to secure their own needs. Recognition is also seen as advancing social inclusion 
and undermining alienation, which could foster social instability (Burton, 1997, p. 
31). Underscoring the influence of psychological theories on frustration, fostering 
self-esteem does not imply raising aspirations. Rather tackling low self-esteem 
concerns tempering frustration, not firing ambition. Accordingly although the Voices 
of the Poor report speaks of its research method empowering participants and leading 
to „follow-up action‟, it quickly warns against raising false expectations among 
participants (Narayan et al, 2000a, p. 16, p. 24). The ideal personality is far from the 
ambitious masculine moderniser. Male psychology is portrayed negatively in the 
report and characterised by frustration and aggression. The authors repeatedly 
highlight men‟s personalities as dysfunctional, and women‟s personalities as better 
able to cope with insecurities and provide for their families: 
 
Many men are collapsing, falling into domestic abuse and violence […] 
Women, on the other hand, seem to swallow their pride and hit the streets 
to do demeaning jobs to bring food to the family table (ibid., p. 219).  
 
Thus gender policies are also underpinned by concerns to contain frustration and 
antisocial responses to insecurity. Accordingly policy seeks to empower the female 
personality against the male personality as a more appropriate personality to secure 
sustainable households and communities. In sum, international development as 
therapeutic governance proposes emotional adjustment for societies as material 
progress has been abandoned as unrealisable and destabilising, while their 
relationships are judged wanting by affluent post-industrial norms and requiring 
external management.  
 
Effectively, therapeutic governance condemns the norms of the traditional economy, 
while condemning people to that very means of existence. Thus the Voices of the Poor 
report requires relationships within the household to change substantially, and face 
„up to pervasive gender inequalities‟ (ibid., p. 226), even as its understanding of social 
justice does not propose to eradicate the substantial material inequalities between the 
developing and developed world. However, the rather conservative nature of 
international development as therapeutic governance is mystified by apparently 
radical references to empowerment. With the World Bank‟s satisfaction at finding the 
poor want so little, one might recall Galbraith‟s critical words on affluent countries 
long using „the contentment of the poor as the justification of the existing order: 
“They are happy, poor things”‟ (Galbraith, 1979, p. 6). 
 
From national development to human security 
 
It is arguably a misnomer to speak of international development when development 
policy no longer aspires to material transformation and is orientated around survival 
and preventing frustration, that is, a soft security programme. Indeed the overlap 
between the current meaning of development and the concept of human security has 
been remarked upon (Mack, 2004, p. 50). If human security means freedom from fear 
and want, it is not evident how a development model orientated around limiting 
wants, satisfying basic needs, and preventing frustration aspires to anything beyond 
the security agenda. Since international development now offers so little materially to 
populations globally, its continuing existence may perhaps better be understood as 
addressing the therapeutic needs of the international community to feel a sense of 
moral purpose. To paraphrase the Voices of the Poor report on the importance of 
maintaining the poor‟s sense of cultural identity, maintaining a development agenda 
helps international officials „to continue to believe in their own humanity despite 
inhuman conditions‟ (Narayan et al, 2000a, p. 7). The development sector may have 
seen the concept of human security as helping them tap into the greater resources 
enjoyed by the security sector (King, and Murray, 2001-2002, p. 589; Mack, 2004, p. 
49). However, development has effectively become harnessed to a security agenda 
rather security becoming harnessed to a development agenda. The securitised 
development agenda represents a demoralised project. Human security‟s appeal 
among the international development sector as a progressive agenda (Suhrke, 1999, p. 
264) simply illustrates how far developmental aspirations have fallen and the sector‟s 
loss of belief in both development and the developing state. A critical reading of 
human security‟s appeal suggests how the concept has sugared the pill of 
development sector‟s loss of its previous independence and its absorption into 
security policy. Thus human development or human security indices inform security 
risk analysis, rather than reinvigorating an ambitious international development 
project aspiring to universal prosperity. 
 
Today‟s anti-development development model has far-reaching consequences for the 
position of developing states within the international order and their relation to their 
societies. Current development strategies have abandoned aspirations for securing the 
capacity of developing states and their equality with developed states, that is, 
abandoning economic advancement entails abandoning the aspiration for international 
equality and acceptance of inequality between states. In short, developing countries 
are destined to stay „quasi-states‟ (Jackson, 1990): states nominally sovereign but 
lacking the capacity domestically to guarantee social justice and welfare for their 
populations, and lacking the capacity internationally to ensure they were treated as 
equals with the developed states. Here we come to the other side of human security: 
its military humanitarian agenda arising logically from the changed international 
development agenda. Namely humanitarian intervention compliments the erosion of 
the developing state‟s capacity in its challenge to the political sovereignty of the 
developing state. 
 
The postwar international security system based on the principles of national security 
and the principle of non-interference in the affairs of states was premised on states 
having the capacity to guarantee their own security. Thus the international security 
system was dependent on developing the newly independent states. This collective 
security model becomes untenable without national development. So whereas the 
newly independent states looked forward to securing their capacity in the early heady 
days of international development, incapacity has become an indefinite condition for 
many states following international development‟s demise. The international division 
has widened between developed states with the capacity to guarantee their own 
security and developing states lacking capacity. This phenomenon is also represented 
as a moral division between responsible enforcing states and failing violating states 
whose populations need to be protected by the international community of responsible 
states. Hence the concept of human security encapsulates both the changed 
development agenda and the changed international security agenda which has shifted 
from a Realist security system to a system of global governance managed by the 
major powers and guided by risk analysis. 
 However, global governance contains serious contradictions, which undermine its 
capacity to provide global security. Global governance by-passes the developing state 
to assume a more direct relationship with developing populations, even as it assumes 
continuing material differences between developed and developing world. Yet 
without national development, populations‟ expectations are no longer orientated 
within a national project, but become globalised under global governance. In Zaki 
Laidi‟s inspired analysis of globalisation, populations within a „world social system‟ 
are encouraged to „have the feeling of living in real time with the rich peoples of the 
North‟, and thereby compare their lifestyles, making them „more reluctant to accept 
the values of patience‟ (Laidi, 1998, p. 49). The unintended consequence of global 
governance is to fuel negative comparisons and feed frustrations, rather than „giving 
long-distance education on moderation‟ (ibid, p. 49). Consequently, human security, 
as a model of global governance, needs to re-assert cultural differences between 
people to legitimise its distinct visions for populations in the developed and 
undeveloped world, rather contradicting claims to speak for a common humanity. 
 
Ironically the Cold War security framework provided greater scope than today for 
international development to forge a path distinct from security policy. The concept of 
human security does not represents a progressive agenda, but accepts a world in 
which underdevelopment and inequality between states and differences between 
populations are re-naturalised. Earlier development thinking was preoccupied with 
„attacking accommodation‟ and breaking „the equilibrium of poverty‟ (Galbraith, 
1962, p. 64). However, accommodation appears to be the goal of today‟s securitised 
development policy, wary of advancing production and raising material aspirations. 
Yet I suggest serious contradictions exist in the human security model of global 
governance. Not least legitimising far-reaching global interventions, encompassing 
the very subjectivity of populations, clashes with the desire to contain expectations 
among populations and discourage population movement through fostering self-
sustaining communities. The contradiction between radical intervention and the 
containment of expectations and population movement is hardly a recipe for social 
stability globally. The contradictions of human security are only reconcilable in so far 
as the concept remains a rhetorical appeal to rally a demoralised development 
community or to legitimise security policy among a traditionally hostile audience. The 
concept of human security embodies neither a viable development policy nor a viable 
security policy. 
 
Note: I would like to thank Anthony Forster and Mark Duffield and the anonymous 
for their encouraging critical comments and advice. Please note this is an non-proofed 
version of the final article. 
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1
 Many of the reports on human security are available on the internet. There are also a number of useful 
web sites providing information on human security sources. One informative site is sponsored by 
Harvard University, including a detailed bibliography on human security: 
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/hpcr/events/hsworkshop/bibliography.pdf 
